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Hasana Sharp
In this chapter, through attention to the virtue of generosity, I offer an alternative 
solution to the puzzle Daniel Garber presents in his 1994 paper on sociability 
and freedom in Spinoza’s Ethics. Garber identifies a tension within Spinoza’s 
doctrine, according to which (i) freedom is the ability to be an adequate cause 
of one’s own actions and (ii) freedom entails the desire for friendship, society, 
and mutual aid.1 Freedom as adequate causation seems to imply self-sufficiency, 
but Spinoza frequently links the desire for sociability to our unavoidable lack of 
self-sufficiency. In the Political Treatise, Spinoza observes that “it’s futile for one 
person alone to try to protect himself from all others,”2 and for this reason each 
of us intrinsically fears solitude.3 In the Ethics, immediately after invoking the 
adage “Man is a God to Man,” Spinoza’s thoughts turn to the prosaic: “Men still 
find by experience that by helping each other they can provide themselves much 
more easily with the things they require, and that only by joining forces can 
they avoid the dangers which threaten on all sides.”4 Society thus appears to be 
a response to our vulnerability and finitude. Spinoza often frames the desire for 
society in negative terms, as a mode of protection from violence, the elements, 
and deprivation, which protection is necessary given the limited powers of 
individuals.5
But Spinoza also positively aligns freedom, rationality, and sociability 
throughout his writings. Spinoza asserts that one who exercises virtue—
understood as the power and freedom proper to one’s nature—necessarily 
strives for society and the well-being of others. “The good which everyone who 
seeks virtue wants for himself, he also desires for other men.”6 The guidance 
of reason directs each to persevere in her own being and, concomitantly, to 
pursue the shared enjoyment of common goods.7 Despite Spinoza’s multiple 
assertions that rationality entails sociability, Garber finds that he “has no real 
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arguments to that conclusion.”8 Garber thus proposes the following: sociability, 
cooperation, and interdependence follow from one’s desire for freedom, but not 
from its attainment. While sociability is a necessary means to freedom, it is 
not a consequence of it. Since sociability involves dependency on others rather 
than self-sufficiency, on his account, it must express our neediness rather than 
our power.
Attention to generosity as an expression of freedom, I suggest, points toward 
a different way to dissolve the dilemma. It is certainly true that Spinoza often 
argues from our finitude to the necessity and indissolubility of social order in 
general. Nevertheless, need is not the only basis of sociability. Insofar as we are 
rational, free, and virtuous, we exercise hard-won social skills, such as generosity. 
Generosity, defined as the rational desire to aid other men and join them in 
friendship, is a powerful art of joining together with others that is no less difficult 
and rare than other practices of natural science. Generosity, I hope to show, is 
not best understood as an alliance of forces, necessary for mortal beings with 
limited time and skills. Sociability as generosity exceeds the realm of need and 
follows directly from our strength of character [fortitudo], because it expresses 
a positive power to overcome anti-social passions, such as hatred, envy, and the 
desire for revenge. Spinoza asserts that generous souls resist and overwhelm 
hostile forces and debilitating affects with wisdom, foresight, and love.9 The 
sociability yielded by generosity, then, is not just a form of cooperation we need 
to survive and produce leisure for study and contemplation. Generosity is not 
a mere means but a positive expression of freedom, because it is the activity 
through which a strong soul (and body) transforms enemies into friends. It 
is not an expression of lack, but of an acquired power that infuses one’s social 
milieu with empowering love and joy, creating agreements in nature and power 
where they did not previously exist. Attention to generosity reveals not only that 
there are social virtues proper to Spinoza’s understanding of freedom but that 
freedom itself is, by necessity, social.
Difficulties of interpretation arise partly because Spinoza’s account of finite 
life as immanent and ineluctably relational implies that freedom is not a binary 
phenomenon, something we have or do not have, but something that complicates 
oppositions between activity and passivity, affecting and being affected. Attention 
to generosity helps address the complexity of freedom as both a product of 
necessity and as a matter of degree. Although I can only provide a small window 
into the full set of questions raised by consideration of the relationship between 
sociability and freedom, I will try to address two. The first is metaphysical, and 
is the primary source of concern for Garber. How can one be understood both 
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to act “from one’s nature alone” and to act with others? How can we reconcile 
adequate causation with acting through community [convenientia]? The second 
may be more phenomenological. The constellation of social virtues expressive 
of fortitudo that Spinoza names evoke self-limitation: generosity, modesty, 
clemency, and chastity. How do these traditionally Christian virtues cohere with 
Spinoza’s activist, or Machiavellian, conception of virtue? I will address these 
two issues in turn.
I. Acting by Oneself with Others
Spinoza defines virtue as “power,” or “the very essence, or nature, of man, 
insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things which can be 
understood through the laws of his nature alone.”10 Since only substance acts 
absolutely without the concurrence of other causes, only God or Nature can be 
understood as entirely self-sufficient, as the exclusive cause of its effects. The 
complex individuals we call “humans” do not cause anything absolutely, but 
they do serve as “adequate causes” of some of their actions.11 Spinoza stipulates 
that “I call that cause adequate whose effect can clearly and distinctly be 
perceived through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be 
understood through it alone.”12 Garber interprets human action to be adequate 
only if it is, in some sense, “causally isolated from the rest of the world,” such 
that one would affect others without being at the same time affected by them. 
Since finite beings are never entirely unaffected by others, they can only ever 
be partially free and rational. He suggests, therefore, that Spinoza’s figure of 
virtue—a man whose acts can be understood through the laws of his nature 
alone—must be an idealization.13 When Spinoza attaches reason, freedom, and 
virtue to sociability—as he does with the notion of generosity—Garber suggests 
that we understand sociability as belonging to the desire for freedom rather than 
to its achievement.14
There can be no question that sociability serves as a condition of possibility 
for freedom, virtue, and reason. We are born radically dependent, ignorant, 
and highly susceptible to the aleas of fortune. We would not live without the 
ministrations of our caretakers who themselves could not provide nourishment 
or induce in us enabling passions without a more or less elaborate network of 
social relations. We require education, political order, and a division of labor to 
become the kinds of beings who are increasingly “conscious of [ourselves], God, 
and things.”15 Certainly, there would be no freedom, no power to produce effects 
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that follow from our natures, without sociality. Sociability is a necessary, albeit 
not sufficient, condition of freedom. We cannot become free all by ourselves. 
Infants raised by wolves, who are harshly abused or severely deprived, do not 
develop those powers that enable them to do what follows from “the laws” of 
a nature Spinoza would describe as human. Nevertheless, Spinoza is not being 
imprecise when he asserts that sociability is also a result of virtue. Indeed, 
generosity is an example of how acting “solely under the guidance of reason” 
entails sociability directly.
Generosity appears at the end of Part 3 of Spinoza’s Ethics, in his discussion of 
active affects. While human life is invariably characterized by subjection to the 
passions and to the common order of Nature,16 we necessarily strive, with more 
or less success, to do those things that follow from and enhance our particular 
natures.17 But what does it mean to do what “follows from one’s nature?” Must 
one be absolute—unconnected and untied to anything else—in order to act, 
according to Spinoza? I do not think so. In fact, we could not act if we were alone 
or absolved of relations with others. Human activity is not the pure self-activity 
of God or Nature as a whole. We produce active affects (or act) insofar as we 
have bodies and (thus also) minds ordered in such a way that they can produce 
effects from their own resources. In other words, as I understand Spinoza, active 
affects express virtue because they are activities that follow from a relationship 
of forces within a composite individual as well as those powers that “agree with” 
that individual’s nature. An active affect, he tells us, is always related to joy or 
desire,18 which means that it indicates an amplification of our power. Rather than 
explaining an increase in one’s power to think and act by a fortunate encounter 
with external forces—such as the uplift in mood delivered by the warm sun—
active affects must be explained by a favorable change in one’s ability to think 
and act that the virtuous agent produces from her “own” resources, but what 
counts as one’s own includes “external” powers that preserve and enhance one’s 
vitality and power.19 Spinoza describes very few active affects, but among them 
is generosity.
Generosity is defined as a desire to aid others and join them to oneself in 
friendship that is guided solely by reason. Since reason is its exclusive cause, 
generosity should be understood as an expression of virtue, or power, which 
follows from the laws of one’s nature alone.20 Spinoza calls desire the “essence” 
of man, but a human’s essence (or nature) is not typically guided by reason 
alone: “The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and by inadequate 
ideas.”21 We strive to think and act from confusion and imagination as well as 
from clarity and understanding. But when we desire from understanding, we 
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express fortitudo, strength of character or mind, which, Spinoza tells us, is 
distinguished by particular active affects: animositas and generositas. Animositas 
names the desire spurred by reason to persevere and aims at the agent’s good 
[utile].22 Spinoza’s dictates of reason clearly link virtue to the desire to persevere 
in being, and so there is nothing puzzling about courage, or the intelligent desire 
to persevere, being proper to strength of character. We might note, however, 
that Spinoza defines the agent’s good, or utile, as whatever enables the body 
to affect others and to be affected, in increasingly many ways.23 The power of 
the agent, for Spinoza, unambiguously includes a power of receptivity as well 
as a power of assertion. The good, power, and virtue of an actor are his or 
her power to coordinate with others, to join forces, and to be transformed in 
enabling ways by other modes in nature. Spinoza’s general rule that our minds 
grow in sophistication as our bodies become capable of being disposed in 
increasingly many ways further underlines how susceptibility to connection is 
a key feature of a finite mode’s agency.24 If what we need in order to think and 
act more powerfully is an increasingly complex power of receptivity, then causal 
isolation, or even independence more generally, is not an apt regulative ideal 
for becoming free. And neither does causal isolation, or radical independence, 
provide a picture of what it is to be free. Finite modes are not substance(s). Our 
freedom is not and should not strive to be absolute, unhinged from society and 
social relations.
When we conceive of courageous striving as a desire to persevere through 
affecting and disposing oneself toward being affected in enabling ways, reason’s 
compulsion toward generosity may seem less paradoxical. Spinoza asserts that 
the agent of virtue is moved by reason [ex solo rationis dictamine] to aid other 
men and join with them in friendship. He doesn’t describe generosity primarily 
as a receptive power, so we ought not understand courage as the active side of 
reason’s striving in contrast to generosity as the passive side. Both animositas and 
generositas are active affects, or what a strong-minded character does by virtue of 
that strength. Generosity follows from the mind insofar as it understands. It does 
not merely provide the conditions amenable to understanding. Rather, generosity 
is understanding’s effect. While there can be no question that connectivity, such 
as that between a mother’s body and her fetus, brings into being activity, Spinoza 
insists also that virtuous activity, as generosity, also produces connectivity, or the 
coming together of diverse agential forces.
For Descartes, as Chantal Jaquet points out, helping others is a “property” 
of generosity but not its essence.25 Cartesian generosity is esteem that follows 
from the true understanding that nothing truly belongs to me other than my 
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free control of my volitions. It is a feeling of resolve to use my will well, and 
only to praise or blame myself or others only on the basis of how we dispose 
our wills.26 Freedom, as free will, is at the basis of Cartesian generosity, and 
sociability is encouraged by generosity, but is not proper to its definition. Thus, 
the connection between freedom, generosity, and sociability is not as tight as it 
is in Spinoza. Spinozan generosity is defined equally by freedom and sociability. 
Since Spinoza plainly rejects freedom as the free control of one’s volitions, we are 
operating with a different understanding of both generosity and freedom.
Freedom for Spinoza is not a faculty proper to our kind, identical in each 
human being, aligning him or her with God, as it is for Descartes.27 Whereas 
for Descartes generosity serves as the basis for something like respect, or proper 
moral regard of oneself and others, for Spinoza generosity is a hard-won ability 
to align not with God but with other people in a mutually enabling way. Like 
Descartes, however, the concept of generosity points toward a commonality. The 
commonality for Descartes is given by our inviolable freedom of will. In Spinoza 
it is made possible by the shared laws of our nature, but nevertheless needs to be 
developed by those who exercise fortitude.
At the risk of excessive repetition, I note again that freedom, or virtue, is the 
power to act from the necessary laws of one’s nature. This idea remains somewhat 
unclear, and interpreters certainly do not have the same understanding of what 
these laws must refer to. Generally, for finite modes, the power to exist and act 
is something that arises between us, by virtue of the necessary laws that govern 
our shared existence. Some of these laws are entirely general. For example, each 
body is composed of a particular ratio of motion and rest. And beings on earth 
are subject to gravity. A singular, finite mode “can neither exist nor act unless it 
has been determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which also 
has a determinate and finite existence.”28 We only exist and act at all because 
we are involved with infinitely many other finite beings. And we are more or 
less active to the extent that we concur with those other finite beings. As the 
example of an infant reminds us, not just any kind of concurrence will do. There 
are particular practices, bodies, and things most able to amplify our physical 
and mental power at a given time. And if our powers combine in mutually 
enabling ways, he maintains that we “agree in nature.” Thus, Spinoza observes:
If [someone] lives among such individuals as agree with his nature, his power 
of acting will thereby be aided and encouraged. On the other hand, if he is 
among men who do not at all agree with his nature, he will hardly be able to 
accommodate himself to them without greatly changing himself. 29 [E4app7]
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The concurrence or hostility of ambient modes is to a great extent a matter of fortune, 
or that which exceeds our power. Since we cannot but imitate the affects of those 
around us, especially those whose bodies and minds share the most with our own, 
the extent to which we can preserve and increase our power is strongly affected by 
the virtue (or lack thereof) of those around us.30 Even if one necessarily finds oneself 
in a social milieu that amplifies one’s powers more or less, the ability of those among 
us to move us with joy and wisdom is owed to their virtuous generosity.
Generosity, for Spinoza, is the capacity to transform others through the 
exercise of one’s own joyful wisdom, an ability which follows necessarily from 
virtue. Spinoza observes that “because, among singular things, we know nothing 
more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, we can best show how 
much our skill and understanding are worth [quantum arte et ingenio valeat] 
by educating men so that at last they live according to the command of their 
own reason.” As often happens, Spinoza’s remarks immediately acknowledge the 
contrary as well: people can be awful, can oppose one another bitterly, and are 
more dangerous than other individuals in nature. Spinoza continues, “Minds, 
however, are conquered not by arms but by love and generosity.”31 He proceeds to 
remark on the supreme utility of friendship, but warns that “skill and alertness,” 
ars et vigilantia, are necessary for this. The value of reason, then, appears in the 
generous power of sociability, a practical art of producing and strengthening 
friendships by bringing others to the threshold of their own reason.
When one acts to enhance the concurrence of powers among neighbors, we 
ought to understand this to be something that follows from one’s nature, even 
if it ought not be attributed to an individual’s exclusive activity. Let us observe 
with Balibar that when Spinoza elaborates his definition of conatus as the “actual 
essence” of each thing, he says:
From the given essence of each thing some things necessarily follow, and things 
are able to produce nothing but what follows from their determinate nature. So 
the power of each thing, or the striving by which it (either alone or with others) 
does anything […] is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.32 [E3p6d]
Spinoza defines the essence of an actual thing not only by what it accomplishes 
independently but also by what it brings about through a concurrence of activity 
with others. This suggests that “our nature” is not circumscribed by what we 
customarily think of as our anthropomorphic individuality. Moreover, what can be 
understood through “the laws of our nature alone” is not only what can be attributed 
to our exclusive authorship. I do not think that the laws of our nature  indicate 
Spinoza in Twenty-First-Century American and French Philosophy284
some kind of given human nature to will freely or to reason. But they do point to 
abilities to think and act that are characteristic of those “like us,” and the more we 
can generate compatibilities, the more we can produce local regularities or laws 
that predictably produce fortitude. Generosity, I suggest, is that power to generate 
convenientia, such that the scope of what follows from our nature is enlarged. 
Freedom as necessary activity—rather than as given faculty—involves the 
alignment and coordination of diverse powers. Generosity is one such description 
of the skill by which commonality and convenientia are brought into being.
II. Militant Generosity
Today we associate generosity with benevolence, altruism, and supererogatory 
acts. Several of the affects that Spinoza associates with fortitudo similarly suggest 
renunciation and self-limitation more than vitality and power. The sub-species 
of courage and generosity—sobriety, moderation, modesty, and chastity—are 
not what we typically associate with self-actualization.33 Despite the Christian 
resonance of pointing to modesty and chastity as expressions of the soul’s power, 
Spinoza’s ethics do not paint a portrait of freedom as a spiritual fortress, a power 
to disengage from the trivialities of earthly life, or a determination to retreat 
into the self. On my interpretation, Spinoza does not advocate the maxim of 
Descartes’s provisional morality, recommending that, in the absence of certainty 
about what to do, we work more on ourselves than on fortune.34 Or perhaps 
better, Spinoza recommends that we work on the forces of fortune such that 
they may become our own. I suggest that Spinoza’s account of generosity and the 
affects that flow from it, modestia and clementia, imply Spinoza’s activist posture 
toward fortune. We will see again that freedom as a social power calls further 
into question the boundaries between the powers we attribute to others and 
those we might rightfully call our own.
Spinoza defines modestia as “a desire to do what pleases men and not what 
displeases them” [cupiditas ea faciendi quae hominibus placent et omittendi quae 
displicent].35 Modesty is a species of ambition, which is defined in the same way, 
but is not typically guided by reason.36 Ambition often prompts us to please others 
through impressing them, distinguishing ourselves, and endeavoring to display our 
superiority. Yet the desire to be a source of joy to others expresses strength when 
guided by reason, because it involves the “skill and temperament” that produce 
an enduring augmentation in their power to think and act. Rather than briefly 
producing joy through a spectacular act, as standard ambition might involve, 
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modestia produces joy in others through offering a more enduring and complete 
pleasure, like, for example, the ability to identify plants, interpret a text, or regard 
oneself as an instance of perfection. Modestia, although not precisely what we tend 
to mean in English by “modesty,” is distinguished from ambition because it does 
not involve displaying our heroic distinction.37 Instead, modestia follows from 
enjoying together those goods that are more enjoyable the more they are shared.38
But because, as Spinoza frequently laments, social life often involves being 
harmed by others, remaining determined by active affects rather than sad 
passions also requires clementia. We need that strength of character that enables 
us “to bear men’s wrongs calmly, and apply [our] zeal to those things which help 
to bring men together in friendship.”39 If we remind ourselves frequently that 
“men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature, then the wrong, or the 
hate usually arising from it will occupy a very small part of the imagination and 
easily be overcome.”40 Whereas Descartes contends that generosity disposes one 
to interpret another’s acts as following from her free will, Spinoza declares that 
imagining one another to be determined by necessity is what promises to deliver 
us from hatred, envy, mockery, and other sad passions.41 Clementia is a power of 
mind because it is grounded in understanding men, including oneself, “as they are 
and not as we would like them to be.”42 Through appreciating the rich network of 
causes within which humans operate, we are freed from the misery of a life fueled 
by hatred and vengeance.43 Forgiveness, or clemency, then, expresses a strength 
of soul rather than a repudiation of an individual’s desire. It involves strength of 
mind directly because our tranquility enables us to understand ourselves and 
others more adequately. And insofar as it enables us to focus on the means to 
engender friendship rather than the means to satisfy our longing for vengeance, 
it contributes to the genuine fund of our power to think and act: sociality.
Spinoza consistently contrasts the desire for retribution, revenge, and war 
with generosity.44 Generosity is an alternative, non-belligerent mode by which 
we can overcome hostile forces. Nonetheless, when Spinoza declares that the 
other’s hate should not be repaid in kind, but should be “conquered” by love and 
generosity, he uses martial language. Generosity involves actively disrupting and 
overpowering the violence of social antagonism. In Spinoza’s words,
One who is eager to overcome hate by love, strives joyously and confidently, 
resists many men as easily as one, and requires the least help of fortune. Those 
whom he conquers will yield joyously, not from lack of strength, but from an 
increase in their powers. [E4p46s]
Generosity, most essentially, is that power to turn haters into lovers, transmuting 
hostile forces into one’s own arms. More evocative of Machiavelli’s Prince than of 
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Jesus Christ,45 Spinozan generosity is not a spiritual largesse that humbly defers 
judgment to God. Rather, generosity actively works on and against the forces of 
hatred to produce new alignments of shared power, pleasure, and knowledge.
Generosity conveys strength rather than weakness, power rather than need, if 
we reflect on Spinoza’s remarks that, in a hostile environment, it is very difficult to 
withstand the desire to react with hatred or cruelty. 46 Joining others to oneself is 
not only a matter of having more hands to accomplish what yours alone cannot. It 
is primarily a matter of responding to adversity with love rather than weakness. To 
join others to ourselves, especially those others who provoke intense sad passions in 
us, requires a powerful soul and body, a mode of being that is not easily perturbed, 
upset, or disintegrated by trauma. Instead, the generous emit joy and desire so 
powerfully that, instead of imitating the hatred of others, those same others 
imitate the generous, yielding joyously. Because their hostility yields to admiration, 
those who might have been enemies become friends.47 Generosity forges relations 
of agreement [convenientia] where they did not previously exist. The strong of 
soul exercise generosity when, rather than being changed by adversity, they 
overwhelm it with their own joyful radiations. In overcoming the hostile affects of 
others, modest generosity upsets the push-pull of struggles for domination with a 
common striving for shared power and joy. It is only great virtue and power that 
can re-order not only one’s perspective on fortune but fortune itself.
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